Inclusion of the Physically Disabled in Mainstream Schools Essay

Inclusion of the Physically Disabled in Mainstream Schools - Essay Example Significant attempts to transform mainstream/state schools and make them more inclusive to the physically disabled students have been made in UK. However, a lot requires to be done to make the mainstream schools completely accommodating to the disabled students. This paper focuses on the measures that mainstream schools in United Kingdom have taken to be more inclusive and meet the needs of the physically disabled. Additionally, the paper will focus on how successful or unsuccessful these measures have been in different institutions and whether the success depends on the resources that the schools have to their disposal. In the recent past, the UK government has dedicated itself to ensuring that all children get equal access to quality education irrespective of their diversity. However, the governments’ objective has not been fully successful. Physically disabled children are one of the groups of people that have been discriminated against in most societies. Investigations the UK education department show that most mainstream schools lacked devices to support disabled student particularly before introduction of the inclusion program. According to the medical model, most people view disability to be identical to disability or as a problem. However, other theories have been developed to counteract this notion. These theories include the post-social, affirmative, and the social models. These theories posit that impairment is not synonymous to disability. They argue that case of disability found amongst the physically challenged persons result since disabled are often not provided with the appropriate environment to reveal they potential. This can be demonstrated by simple aspects such as lack of elevators in most state school, which makes it almost impossible for children using wheelchairs to attend such schools. These contemporary models have greatly contributed to the changes in mainstream school in London to make them more accommodative for the disabled students. Accommodation of the disabled in mainstream schools is in line with the social model, which argues that segregating of the impaired people is irreverent and a sign of oppression. Most efforts made have been to improve the schools and accommodate individuals with impairments such as blindness, deafness, or other impairments that make it impossible for individuals to use the same facilities with normal individuals. Post-social modelists argue that segregation make the persons with impairments pity themselves. The social and post-social models are among the models that have greatly influence the development of inclusion programs in UK (Clough and Corbett 5-11). In ensuring that the physically disabled access quality education, the learning environment must be altered. This is more important in cases where the disability requires the students to make use of supportive devices such as wheelchairs (Department for Education and Skills Web; Norwich 16-28). Importance of the Inclus ion Program Ensuring that persons with disability are not excluded from mainstream education has been the most significant move in guaranteeing equal opportunities for all. There are a several reasons why inclusion of the physically disabled in the mainstream schools is important in UK. One of the reasons is because education is considered crucial in

Summary of chapter 10 Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words

Summary of chapter 10 - Essay Example This is unlike the case in dividends on stock; thus, stockholders are less likely to acquire financial returns as compared to bondholders (Kelly & McGowen 135). Trading securities markets are of two types; primary and secondary markets. Primary securities market refers to when corporations gain more financial capital by selling new securities (Kelly & McGowen 137). On the other hand, secondary securities market trades the previous securities to gain financial capital. Issuing of securities in the primary market occurs in two methods, that is, through a public offering or private placements. Private placements are faster, easier and cheaper as compared to a public offering (Kelly & McGowen 138). In the secondary market, the firms that issue bonds and stock do not receive additional finance when they trade their securities. However, an advantage to the firm is that, at secondary market price, of their stock reflects the investor opinion about the firm’s management (Kelly & McGowen 138). Investors need to keep track on the performance of securities in the market. A major way is to track stock indices. These include; Dow Jones Industrial average, Standard and Poor’s 500 and the NASDAQ Composite Index. These indices help to update the investor and guide him or her in the way of investing (Kelly & McGowen

The Evolution Of English Through Time English Language Essay

The Evolution Of English Through Time English Language Essay In the beginning, life was simple and life forms were non-complex. Communication between these life forms was also simple, spoken communication and languages did not exist. As life evolved, and Homo sapiens began roaming the Earth, the need for spoken communication became necessary and languages were born. Join me in an exploration of how the English language came to be, and how it has evolved over time. . The Roman Empire controlled England for centuries; however, by the early 400s the Irish, Britons, and Anglo Saxons invaded and began settling England for themselves. Though each of these tribes had their own language, their dialects were close enough for them to understand each other. The language that developed from this inter-twining of tribes became known as Anglo-Saxon or Old English. Later, during the 800s, with the arrival of the Vikings, two things happened to this Old English language. The first was that many Old Norse words were added, and the second, was the complex conjugations began to decline as people disagreed about which ones to use. The alphabet of the Old English language did not use the letters k, q, v, x or z, and the pronunciations of some of the letters changed depending upon what letters were near them. Vowels were easy with the short vowels a, e, i, o being pronounced pretty much the same, as they are today, the exception was the vowel u, and its pronunciati on was more like the pronunciation of the word book today. The long vowels were often marked with an accent mark and have a completely different pronunciation from the long vowels sounds we recognize today. Along with short and long vowels, the Old English language included three double vowels, each with short and long versions. In 1066, the French-Normans under the rule of William the Conqueror invaded England bringing political change and their French-Norse language, which they made the official language of the monarchy and elite. However, due to the daily need to communicate with the English peasant class, the common language became English. Prior to the Norman invasion, Latin had only a minor influence on the English language, but afterwards there was an influx of Anglo-Norman words added to the English language. There was a split between original Germanic words used by the common class and the Norman words used by the elite for everyday items. Beef and cow are an example of the split in words used by the elite versus the peasants, as beef was often eaten by the elite, while cows were tended by the peasants. Beef has its roots in Anglo-Norman while cow comes from Germanic roots. Many legal terms are also derived from Anglo-Norman roots because the Normans ran the courts. Sometimes, French words replaced Old English words completely, while other times French and Old English combined creating new words. It is important to understand that Middle English was not the only language spoken during this period in England; Scots, Cornish and Welsh were also spoken and differ from Middle English. This accounts for the significant differences in dialects from each of the above areas versus the dialect spoken in London. Sometime in the 12th century, the French Influence in England began to fade and a number of writers began writing in the vernacular language rather than French, Latin or Greek. The 14th century produced the most notable vernacular writer of the time, Geoffrey Chaucer the author of The Canterbury Tales. Since then, the English language has been absorbing vocabulary from many languages around the world. English steadily adds the creation of new words and new uses for old words by the sub-cultures of the English-speaking world. Until the 16th century, French remained to be the literary language and Latin the scholarly language of Europe. The evolution of Middle English into Early Modern English began during the Renaissance in the 16th century when a renewed interest in education sparked across England and most of Europe. As a result of the growing interest in the writings of antiquity many Latin and Greek words were introduced into the English language. Along with the introduction of new words into the English language a shift of vowels, changes to some consonants and grammar were also part of the evolution of English at this time. As more literary works began to be written, the need for the stabilizing the spelling of words became important. One of the earliest attempts at stabilizing the spelling of words came in 1582 with the book Elementarie, by Richard Mulcaster. Some of the principles he established include the removal of all unnecessary letters, adding letters to words to indicate correct pronunciati on and the use of a final silent e to mark long vowels distinguishing them from short vowels. Mulcaster also established other principles, but these three are the most significant. Many spelling concepts within the English language exist simply because some Norman scribe first spelled an English word using the phonetic principles of his own native language. From the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, the spelling conventions for many words in the English language have been determined by referring to their original forms as a guide; resulting in an unusual combination of old and modern practices. Many of the spellings, including the silent letters of words that we use today were established in the first printed books, and have remained that way because it would have been unfeasible to change printed texts after distribution. By the 17th century, it became abundantly clear that assistance was required for writers to gain a clear understanding of the meanings of words and thei r spelling. One of the first books to offer such assistance was A Table Alphabeticall, published in 1604 by Robert Cawdrey. It was intended to only define difficult and unusual words in the English language that were derived from the Hebrew, Greek, Latin, or French languages. This book contained approximately 2500 words with an interpretation of the meaning. The first book to actually call itself a dictionary though, was The English Dictionarie; published in 1623 by Henry Cockeram. This book was a two part work claiming to be able to not only help readers with the understanding of the difficult to understand writings of some authors, but also to attain speedily an elegant perfection of the English tongue in reading, writing and speaking. The first part of Cockerams book contained brief definitions of words that may have been important to the 17th century elite who may have wanted to leave an educated impression on those they spoke with. Many of his words, were ambiguous contrivances cobbled together from bits and pieces of Latin, and were therefore amusingly inventive; however lacked clear understanding. While the second part of his book reversed the process, listing everyday words, following them with his inventive version of meanings meant to show people how to turn simple statements into more impressive complicated ones. Fortunately, this allure to the obscure finally ended. The 18th century once again brought changes to the English language. These evolutionary changes were brought on by two major events; the first was the ascent of the British Empire and the British Industrial Revolution. The ascent of the British Empire introduced the English language to the world; and the new discoveries in the industrial and scientific fields introduced new words into the English language. The classic languages did not support words like oxygen, nuclear, protein or vaccine, therefore Late Modern English relied heavily on Latin and Greek for the creation of these new words. Late Modern English is the form of English that has lasted through to the 21st century, continuing to add new words every few years, as generations of people start using them. A perfect example of 21st century evolution in English today, is the use of SMS language to replace complete words while using the newest technology of cellular phones and computer chat rooms in the internet. SMS English is t he use of acronyms to state either a whole word or a grouping of words to relay a message. It is a form of the English language that was used during the time of the telegraph, and although using it to relay a message within a text message may be faster and easier, it does not follow any standard rules for grammar or spelling or even which acronyms are word specific. Some have claimed that the use of SMS English is wrecking the English language, and from what I have heard and read in my college rhetoric classes, I tend to agree. However, with the addition of at least one SMS word in the English dictionary recently, it appears that the increased use of this dialect is at hand. What evolutionary change could be next after that of SMS? Could the English language evolve from SMS to more technical forms like that of fax machines? Can you imagine walking into a classroom or down the street and listening to people use beeps and slurs to communicate? One thing we do know for sure is that change and evolution is inevitable, and the changes on the horizon will come just as we learn what OMG and LOL are meant to convey.

Plato on the Existence of Negative Forms Essay -- Plato Philosophy Neg

Plato on the Existence of Negative Forms The question of the origin and nature of evil in the world has preoccupied philosophers throughout history. The ancient philosopher Plato does not directly address this question in his writings, but it can be argued that the logic of his theory of forms demands the existence of forms that are negative in meaning, such as the evil and the bad. When discussing his theory of imitation, Plato alludes to the principle that whenever there are many things of the same nature, there is one form for that nature. In several passages, Plato makes mention of many negative things. It can be debated, however, whether or not the negative has a positive ontological character of its own for which there can be a form. The several senses in which an object can be considered negative must first be distinguished before the texts of Plato can be analyzed. It will be shown that, although Plato makes references in the Republic to a common nature amongst many negative things, the supposition of a negative form is not in harmony with the hierarchal structure of forms that depends on the good, which is also presented in the Republic. A solution to this problem will be presented and analyzed. In order to understand why it is argued that negative forms must exist according to Plato's logic, one must first understand the meaning of form for Plato. Plato thinks that forms are separate and eternal entities that exist apart from the sensible world. Plato thinks that objects in the sensible world imitate a particular form and that form makes them what they are. Plato writes, "As you know, we customarily hypothesize a single form in connection with each of the many things to which w... ...rendon Press), 167-9. [4] Ross, 168. [5] Ross, 168. [6] Plato, Statesman, trans. Seth Benardete (Chicage: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 262 d. [7] Plato, Republic, 491 d 3. [8] Plato, Republic, 608 e 3. [9] Plato, Republic, 609 a 4-7. [10] Plato, Republic, 610 b 4-6. [11] Plato, Republic, 382 b. [12] Plato, Republic, 476 a. [13] Plato, Republic, 507 b 10-11. [14] Plato, Republic, 509 b 11-c. [15] Plato, Republic, 508 c-e. [16] Plato, Republic, 508 b ? 509 a 3. [17] Plato, Republic, 509 b 7 - 7 [18] Plato, Republic, 379 a 6 - c. [19] I.M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato?s Doctrines: Plato on Knowledge and Reality (New York: The Humanities Press), 283. [20] Crombie, 283. [21] Crombie, 284. [22] Plato, Statesman, 262 d. [23] Ross, 169. [24] Plato, Republic, 491 d 3. [25] Crombie, 284.

Human being Essay

There has always been a concern as to why some people behave in some weird ways that not any ordinary person will act in such a manner. It is a fact that all individuals are different from each other but there are expectations that human beings have over others. That certain character trait should not be expected in a normal human being. A study into the issues of psychopath and sociopath will help to show some light to the question of how different persons can be described and classified in a view of understanding human behavior and human psychology. Who are psychopaths or sociopaths? According to Patrick (2007) a psychopath or a sociopath is an individual who displays unique unordinary behaviors as compared to the other normal human beings. Such an individual shows signs of not having any guilt or troubled conscience for something he or she has done which is wrong, likes putting blame on other people for the mistakes that he or she commits, likes lying all the time about several issues, do not value other people as fellow human beings, get involved in destructive actions fights and wars, some are sexually irresponsible, have low self control, not realistic in whatever they plan and do, and seem to attract the attention of others by portraying a false picture of themselves among other unordinary behaviors. What are the causes? As argued in Goldstein and Weiner (2003) there are some reasons that have been found out to result in the development of such character traits some of them include; in born traits that a person inherits from his or her family background, some could happen where the society in which people live in draws lines of behaviors that seem to be extra ordinary from the rest of others in the society, would come also as a result of the influences of the external environment and as a result of the adaptive strategies in a bid to survive in the world with others and the problems and experiences that a person underwent while growing will also contribute like if a person was exposed to violent circumstances in hi or her childhood the same things are likely to be done by that person. Is the female psychopath different from the male sociopath? How and in what way? Why is this important to understand? The way in which a female psychopath behaves tends to be more similar to that of their male counterparts although the ratio of male to female a bit higher. The kind of activities that they involve themselves in are the ones that will help to distinguish the differences but basically the same idea is that they all display behaviors that seem to be unruly, Berecz (1999). A female psychopath will show behaviors like; most of them would not want to get into a serious marriage commitment by staying with a husband but instead would prefer to stay alone with her children, would want to be draw the attention of the people around her, likely to mistreat her own children, she does not want to strive for anything that can help her but instead will want other people to do everything she is supposed to do for her benefit Million, Simonsen and Smith (2003). According to Gill and Barraclough (2007) such a female person is too proud of herself and could want to have all the things that others have to herself. In some cases will want to attempt suicide as a way to deal with her problems, all her life she will be blaming other people for the miseries she might be undergoing. She engages in criminal activities like conning people their belongings, leading people to crimes, are drug addicts of a high extent with their life styles leading to sex exploits and males and females they way she wishes for herself which in some instances could include killing. As discussed in Herve and Yuille (2007) the males will involve themselves in very many sexual relationships with women and will be able to convince women with a lot of ease to get into relationships with him. He tends to spend his money in a reckless way, like involving themselves in criminal activities like murder, violent robberies, once he marries he is likely to abandon his wife and children and being unfaithful to the other spouse. Involve themselves in ungodly acts like having sex with the animals, would like to cover his weaknesses with good acts like being generous with his wealth. They are also likely to drug addicts like alcohol, bhang among others. Conclusion According to the analysis that has been made above the way Female psychopaths behave is different from the way male sociopaths would behave because men are more energetic and will display the disorders that they have with relating with others by use of applying force in either fighting, car breaking , among other physical means of applying force. As for the females their disorders will be see through the various reacts that a female will undertake like her talking and other means of communication. They involve themselves in many sexual relationships and will get away with it from all the partners without admitting to that behavior among others Berecz (1999). Word count 876 References Alan Goldstein, Irving Weiner (2003). Forensic psychology: Forensic psychology. John Wiley and sons publishers. Christopher J. Patrick (2007). Handbook of Psychopathy. Guilford press. David Gill, Jennifer Barraclough (2007). Hughes’ outline of modern psychiatry. 5th edition, John Wiley and sons publishers. John M. Berecz (1999). Sexual styles: a psychologist’s guide to understanding our lover’s personality. Humanics publishing group H Herve, John C. Yuille (2007). The psychopath: theory, research and practice. Routledge publishers. Theodore Million, E. Simonsen, M. B smith (2003). Psychopapthy: Antisocial, criminal and violent behavior. Guilford press. .

Strategies of Knowledge Acquisition

Strategies of Knowledge Acquisition Author(s): Deanna Kuhn, Merce Garcia-Mila, Anat Zohar, Christopher Andersen, Sheldon H. White, David Klahr, Sharon M. Carver Source: Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, Vol. 60, No. 4, Strategies of Knowledge Acquisition (1995), pp. i+iii+v-vi+1-157 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Society for Research in Child Development Stable URL: http://www. jstor. org/stable/1166059 . Accessed: 16/09/2011 13:38 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . ttp://www. jstor. org/page/info/about/policies/terms. jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email  protected] org. Black well Publishing and Society for Research in Child Development are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development. ttp://www. jstor. org OF MONOGRAPHS THE IN FOR SOCIETY RESEARCH CHILD DEVELOPMENT Serial No. 245, Vol. 60, No. 4, 1995 OF STRATEGIES KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION Deanna Kuhn Merce Garcia-Mila Anat Zohar Andersen Christopher BY WITH COMMENTARY SheldonH. White David Klahr and Sharon M. Carver BY AND A REPLY THEAUTHORS MONOGRAPHSTHE OF SOCIETY RESEARCH FOR INCHILD DEVELOPMENT SerialNo. 245, Vol. 60, No. 4, 1995 CONTENTS ABSTRACT v I. INTRODUCTION 1 II. METHOD 24 III. KNOWLEDGE IN ACQUISITION ADULTS 33 IV. KNOWLEDGE IN ACQUISITION CHILDREN 42 V. STRATEGIES STRATEGY AND CHANGE ADULTS 50 IN VI.STRATEGIES STRATEGY AND CHANGE CHILDREN 64 IN VII. THE PROCESS CHANGE OF 75 VIII. CONCLUSIONS 98 REFERENCES121 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 128 COMMENTARY TOWARD EVOLUTIONARY AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC REASONING SheldonH. Wh ite 129 SCIENTIFIC THINKING ABOUT SCIENTIFIC THINKING David Klahr and Sharon M. Carver 137 REPLY SCIENTIFIC AND KNOWLEDGE THINKING ACQUISITION Deanna Kuhn 152 CONTRIBUTORS 158 STATEMENT OF EDITORIAL POLICY 160 ABSTRACT KUHN, DEANNA; GARCIA-MILA,MERCE; ZOHAR, ANAT; and ANDERSEN, CHRISTOPHER. WithCommentary Strategiesof KnowledgeAcquisition. nd H. KLAHR SHARON CARVER; and SHELDON WHITE by DAVID M. by KUHN. and a Reply by DEANNA theSociety Research in Monographs of for Child 1995, 60(4, SerialNo. 245). Development, In this Monograph, is knowledgeacquisition examinedas a processinthe coordinationof existing theorieswith new evidence. Although volving researchers studyingconceptualchange have describedchildren'sevolving theorieswithinnumerousdomains,relatively little attentionhas been given to the mechanisms meansof whichtheoriesare formed and revisedand by knowledgeis therebyacquired.Centralto the presentworkis the claimthat strategiesof knowledge acquisitionmay vary significantlyacross (as well as within) individualsand can be conceptualizedwithin a developmental framework. To studythese strategiesand their development,we use a microgenetic method. Our application the method allowsextendedobservation the of of of acquisition knowledgewithina domain,of the strategiesused to acquire this knowledge,and of the changein these strategies overtime.The method also allows qualitativeanalysisof individualsand quantitativeanalysisof groups to be used in complementary ways. Knowledge acquisition processeswereexaminedat twoage levels. Community college adults and preadolescentsparticipatedin two 30-45-min individualsessionseach week over a 10-weekperiod. Subjectsworked on problemsinvolvinga broad range of contentfrom both physicaland social domains. A transfer design was situated within this microgeneticframework,for the purposeof assessinggeneralityof strategies withthe introduction of new content.Subjectsof both ages showedprogressacrossthe 10 weeksin the level of strategie sused as well as similarity the form that this progresstook. in levelsthatdid not varygreatly,childrenshowed Despiteinitialperformance V less strategic improvement than adults and inferior knowledge acquisition. Strategic progress was maintained by both groups when new problem content was introduced midway through the sessions. The results thus indicate significant generality of strategies and strategy change across content, as well as populations.A further indication of generality was the emergence of new strategies at about the same time in the social and physical domains, even though performance in the social domain overall lagged behind that in the physical domain. At the individual level, mixed usage of valid and invalid strategies was the norm. This finding in an adult population suggests that this variability is a more general characteristic of human performance, rather than one unique to states of developmental transition.Another broad implication of this variability is that single-occasion assessment may provide an at best incomplete, and often misleading, characterization of an individual's approach. Still another implication is that at least part of variability in performance across content resides in the subject, rather than exclusively in the task. That superior strategies present in an individual's repertory are not always applied highlights the fact that more is involved in competent performance than the ability to execute effective strategies.Metastrategic competence-the ability to reflect on and manage strategic knowledge-and metacognitive competence-the ability to reflect on the content of one's knowledge-are emphasized as critical components of cognitive development. These competencies determine the strategies that are actually used, among those potentially available, and therefore the effectiveness of an individual's performance. Finally, the presence of multiple strategies and multiple forms of competence greatly complicates the portrayal of developmental change. Rather than a nidimensional transition from a to b, the change process must be conceptualized in terms of multiple components following individual (although not independent) paths. VI I. INTRODUCTION Knowledge acquisition is a process fundamental to survival that begins early and continues throughout the life span. What do we know of the process? Research within the last decade has made it clear that from an early age knowledge is organized into theories that are elaborated and revised over time and that serve as vehicles for understanding the world.In other words, knowledge acquisition to a large degree occurs through a process of theory formation and revision. Among researchers adopting a knowledge- or theory-based approach to cognitive development, the focus has been on describing the content of these evolving theories in a wide range of domains, and we now know a good deal about the progressively more elaborated knowledge that children of various ages ar e likely to have within numerous content domains (Gelman & Wellman, in press; Wellman & Gelman, 1992).In contrast, relatively little attention has been given to the process of knowledge acquisition itself, that is, the mechanisms by means of which theories are formed and revised and knowledge is thereby acquired. It is this topic that is the focus of the present work. Within the knowledge-based approach, the assumption that has been at least implicit, and is occasionally voiced explicitly (Brewer & Samarapungavan, 1991; Carey, 1985a, 1986), is that these mechanisms remain more or less constant across development.The present work rests on a contrasting claim that strategies of knowledge acquisition vary significantly across (as well as within) individuals and can be conceptualized in developmental terms. KNOWLEDGE AS ACQUISITION THEORY-EVIDENCE COORDINATION The general form of knowledge and knowledge acquisition studied here is that of the relation between one category of event and a nother. Most commonly, such relations are construed causally (Cheng & Nisbett, 1993), with an antecedent category of event interpreted as influencing an outcome IKUHNETAL. category (e. g. , ingestion of food and a child's bodily growth). Underpinning this form of knowledge is a more basic one having to do with how events or objects fit together into categories (e. g. , foods, nonfoods, and permanent vs. temporary bodily changes). Although the latter is not examined here, both forms of knowledge involve theories as organizing devices (Barrett, Abdi, Murphy, & Gallagher, 1993; Keil, 1991; Medin, 1989; Wisniewski & Medin, 1994).Children's and adults' theories about causal relations undergo revision as new evidence is encountered. Hence, knowledge acquisition strategies involve the evaluation of evidence and inductive causal inference. Recent theories of inductive causal inference in adults (Cheng & Novick, 1990, 1992) are consistent with earlier accounts (Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Holla nd, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986) in attributing prominent roles both to prior expectation (or theory) and to evidence of covariation (of the relevant factors) in fostering inferences of causality.It is difficult to explain not only simple concept formation (Keil, 1991) but even basic conditioning phenomena in animals without invoking a construct that involves expectation (Holyoak, Koh, & Nisbett, 1989). A conception of inductive inference as involving a coordination of theory and evidence (Kuhn, 1989) contrasts with earlier approaches to the development of inductive inference strategies-for example, the Piagetian research on formal operations-in which such strategies were regarded as largely domain independent and therefore equally applicable to any content irrespective of prior knowledge or expectation.In empirical studies of adults' multivariable inductive causal inference, subjects typically are provided with a set of multiple instances in which one or more potential causes does or does not occur and an outcome is present or absent (Cheng & Novick, 1990, 1991; Downing, Sternberg, & Ross, 1985; Schustack & Sternberg, 1981). The subject is asked to evaluate the evidence and draw inferences regarding the causal status of one or more of the factors.Although this approach can reveal much about how varying patterns of evidence affect inference, it does not lend much insight into the minimumconditions for an inference of causality, which may be as little as a single co-occurrence (of antecedent and outcome), even in the clear presence of additional covariates (Kuhn & Phelps, 1982). Moreover, in natural settings, even when multiple instances are readily available, there is no reason to believe that individuals will seek out and attend to all of them.For both these reasons, we were interested in studying situations in which subjects are free to select the evidence on which they base their inferences, a condition that links the present work to research on scien tific reasoning (Klahr, Fay, & Dunbar, 1993; Kuhn, Amsel, & O'Loughlin, 1988; Kuhn, Schauble, & Garcia-Mila, 1992), as we discuss further later in this chapter. Yet the cognitive skills examined in this Monograph are, we believe, 2 STRATEGIES KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUISITION epresentative of processes of knowledge acquisition and inductive inference more broadly (Kuhn, 1993). We therefore situate the present work in this broader context. Methodologically, this means that we examine knowledge acquisition across a broad range of domains involving both physical and social phenomena, rather than restricting the investigation to traditional scientific domains. THE MICROGENETIC METHOD To study knowledge acquisition strategies and their development, we use a microgenetic method.The virtues of the microgenetic method as a tool for examining change have been elaborated in our own earlier work (Kuhn & Phelps, 1982) and more recently by Siegler and Crowley (1991). The evolution of behaviors that one o bserves over time in microgenetic study can serve to corroborate cross-sectional differences in performance. Most important, however, the method offers the opportunity for detailed analysis of the process of change. Later in this chapter, we summarize findings from previous research utilizing a microgenetic method.An important feature of the method is that changes over time are initiated by subjects themselves, in interaction with the problems materials, rather than by the investigator, who provides no instruction or feedback with respect to a subject's approaches to a problem. The rationale is that increased density of exercise of existing strategies may lead to change that, except for occurring comparatively rapidly, otherwise resembles a naturally occurring change process.The researcher is thereby afforded close observation of the process. In addition, a third potential benefit of the method is its capacity to provide a fuller, more accurate picture of competence than can be atta ined using a single-occasion method. If a subject's performance improves after a few sessions of engagement, it tells us that this level of performance was within the subject's capabilities and accordingly should be recognized as part of his or her competence, or â€Å"zone of proximal development† in Vygotsky's (1978) terms.In several respects, the method used in the work reported in this Monograph is an elaborated form of the microgenetic method, one that has not been used in other microgenetic research. First, we simultaneously track two kinds of change over time within a domain. One is the subject's evolving knowledge within that domain (specifically, knowledge of the causal and noncausal relations among variables that reflect the structure of the domain). The second kind of change is in strategies of knowledge acquisition, which may also evolve as knowledge is being acquired.In other uses of the microgenetic method, typically only one form of change has been observed, 3 KUHNETAL. for example, in strategies for solving addition problems (Siegler & Jenkins, 1989). A second respect in which the basic microgenetic method is elaborated is that we observe change within multiple domains in which the subject is engaged at the same time. Doing so allows us to compare both knowledge acquisition and evolving strategy usage across domains (as well as relating the two to one another within domains).We wished to examine a broad range of domains, involving both physical and social content, to establish the generality of the knowledge acquisition processes being examined. The research design thus stipulated that each subject undergo parallel engagement with one problem in the physical content domain and one problem in the social content domain. A number of considerations lead to the prediction of greater challenge (and hence inferior performance) in the social domain. Among these are the possibly more extensive initial knowledge (whether or not it is correct) in t he social domain and possibly greater ffective investment in this knowledge (Kunda, 1990), either of which would make the task of theory-evidence coordination more difficult. A third elaboration of the microgenetic method is reflected in a research design that incorporates a traditional transfer design within a microgenetic framework. The purpose, again, is to establish generality of the knowledge acquisition strategies that we examine. The traditional transfer design used to assess generality of a skill across content domains is problematic for a number of reasons that we need not review here.A further problem arises if (as we show here to be the case) a subject at a given point in time does not possess just a single strategy but instead selects strategies from a repertory of multiple strategies. If so, single-occasion assessment within a single content domain may produce an inaccurate and misleading characterization (since the subject could have selected a different strategy on th is particular occasion and might do so on another occasion); in this case, accurate single-occasion assessment of generality acrossdomains is precluded.The multiple-task, multiple-occasion assessment employed here allows us to assess generality in a more dynamic way than is afforded by a traditional transfer design. Each subject worked on a problem in the physical domain at one weekly session and a problem in the social domain at a second weekly session, for each of the first 5 weeks of a 10-week period of observation. At the beginning of the sixth week, new problems within each of the domains were substituted, and the sessions continued for the remaining five weeks.The question we ask is whether the substitution of new content affects the strategies that the subject uses. To the extent that the same set of strategies that a subject uses in the final encounters with the initial problem carries over to the new content, some degree of domain generality (of both strategies and strategy change) is indicated. A final elaboration of the microgenetic method is to replicate the design 4 STRATEGIES KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUISITION with multiple age groups, enabling us to compare the knowledge acquisition process across age levels.In addition to providing further evidence regarding the generality of knowledge acquisition processes (across populations in this case, rather than content), this comparison is important in addressing a more specific question. The pattern observed in our own as well as others' microgenetic work has been one of mixed, or variable, strategy usage, as we describe in the next section. In other words, instead of a single, consistent approach, the subject shows variable usage of a variety of more and less competent approaches, even though the problem environment remains constant.An ambiguity arises, however, owing to the fact that the subjects observed in microgenetic work have been either assumed or assessed to be in a state of transition with respect to t he competencies in question. It is possible, therefore, that the variable strategy usage that has been observed is a particular characteristic of a developmental transition state, as dynamic systems theories of development predict (Van der Maas & Molenaar, 1992). It thus becomes important to ask whether the same variability over repeated occasions would be observed among populations at other than a characteristic age of transition.If it is, it suggests that this variability is a more general characteristic of human performance, rather than one unique to states of developmental transition. To address this fundamental question, we chose preadolescents and community college adults as the two populations on which to base such a comparison. Previous work (Klahr et al. , 1993; Kuhn et al. , 1988) establishes the preadolescent age level as one at which the strategies in question are just beginning to emerge.However, some young adult populations show initial levels of performance little mor e advanced than those characteristic of preadolescents (Kuhn et al. , 1988), enabling us to compare subjects of these two ages in a microgenetic design. In addition to establishing whether strategy change occurs at periods other than the typical period of developmental transition, the design allows cross-age comparison of the process of knowledge acquisition as well as of the interaction of knowledge acquisition and strategy change. Another set of questions centers on the effects of the exercise provided by the microgenetic method.Despite similar starting points, does one age group show more rapid evolution of strategies than another group, both having been provided comparable exercise? Does such change differ only in degree or also in form? These questions are central to establishing the generality of knowledge acquisition strategies across populations. A final purpose of this Monographis to present a method of analysis that combines qualitative analysis of individuals with quantit ative analysis of groups of individuals. Observers of the field's progress, such as White (1994a, 1994b), have lamented the limited range of methods to which devel5KUHNETAL. opmental researchers have restricted themselves. Especially in undertaking to study the difficult topic of processes of change, innovative methods are called for. In particular, the study of individual subjects is receiving increasing attention as an important and neglected method. As a research method, however, single-subject analysis most often is treated skeptically, and even dismissed, on the assumption that it is severely limited by its inability to provide evidence of the generality of the phenomena observed.Here, we undertake to illustrate how individual and group, as well as qualitative and quantitative, modes of analysis can be used in conjunction to provide an enriched understanding of developmental phenomena. In the next section, we discuss previous research in more detail, in order to situate the pre sent research effort in the context of various lines of work to which it connects. The reader wishing to focus exclusively on the present work can proceed directly to the final section of this chapter, which introduces the inference forms that figure prominently in later chapters.THE PRESENT STUDY THE IN CONTEXT PASTRESEARCH OF FromLearning ConceptualChange to It was only a few decades ago that knowledge acquisitionand learning were treated as synonymous terms, both referring to a process of strengthening of associative bonds between stimuli and responses. In developmental psychology, Kendler and Kendler (1975) deserve the major credit for moving the field beyond a conceptualization of the developing child as a â€Å"cluster of interrelated responses† (Bijou & Baer, 1961, p. 4) and delving into the black box that represented mental phenomena. Although the Kendlers' modeling of such phenomena in terms of covert stimuli and responses was highly restrictive, they demonstrated co nvincingly that the learning process cannot be studied without considering the developmental status of the organism. That insight remains a central one today. What individuals already know and how that knowledge is organized constrains what and how new knowledge will be acquired.The burgeoning area of research that has come to be known as the study of conceptual change documents the development of knowledge in numerous domains, with physics (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1987, 1992) and biology (Carey, 1985b) the domains that have been the object of greatest study. Extensive literature reviews are provided by Gelman and Wellman (in press) and Wellman and Gelman (1992). The main tenet underlying and connecting these individual lines of 6 STRATEGIES KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUISITION research is that cognitive development can be adequately accounted for in terms of developing knowledge within content domains.As a consequence, findings are largely specific to the domain studied. The major insight that ext ends across domains is the theory-like organization of knowledge. Even the properties that define simple concepts cluster and mutually support one another. Conceptions of such homeostatic causal clusters, and the mechanisms underlying them, are the â€Å"glue† that makes features cohere (Keil, 1991). At a less elementary level, evidence exists suggesting that young children's theories have properties such as consistency, coherence, comprehensiveness, and explanatory power (Brewer & Samarapungavan, 1991; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992).As noted earlier, relatively little attention has been given to the mechanisms that effect theory change. When and how does new evidence lead to modification of existing theories? Despite theoretical claims that these mechanisms are developmentally invariant (Brewer & Samarapungavan, 1991; Carey, 1985a, 1986), little empirical work has been devoted to investigating them. Some research has been done to support claims that theory change will be more dif ficult to accomplish if it crosses ontological categories (Chi, 1992), involves radical (vs. eak) restructuring (Carey, 1990), or violates entrenched beliefs (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). But how should the mechanisms of change be conceptualized? Keil (1988, 1989, 1991) has addressed this question with respect to the formation of elementary concepts, contrasting accounts maintaining (a) that such concepts arise out of networks of associations observed in the environment, (b) that the process is theory guided, or (c) that at some point a developmental shift occurs from the first to the second process.Keil (1991) rejects the possibilities of an exclusive associative network process and a developmental shift from such a process to a theory-guided one, asking how coherent theories could arise out of networks of associations. Instead, he proposes, all concepts represent a blend of an associative matrix overlaid with causal beliefs. Humans have evolved adaptations for building knowledge rep resentations about sets of regularities in the world, but these processes are never completely data driven or completely theory driven.In the present work, we address a similar question regarding the mechanisms of conceptual change but in this case with respect to the secondorder concepts of relations (particularly causal relations) between elementary conceptual categories. We adopt a perspective resembling Keil's that the mechanism entails the coordination of new evidence with an existing network of theories. What are the strategies that an individual uses to achieve this coordination, and do they change with age and practice? Addressing this question leads to the topics of inductive causal inference and scientific reasoning.First, however, we examine issues involved in the study of change. 7 KUHNETAL. Learning,Transfer,and the Study of Change The process of knowledge acquisition is likely to figure prominently in any comprehensive theory of human cognitive functioning. One promine nt example is Sternberg's (1984, 1985) triarchic theory, in which knowledge acquisition mechanisms are one of several core components of the intellect. But how is knowledge acquisition studied empirically? Psychologists studying very simple, short-term learning processes may be able to observe these processes directly in the laboratory.The study of more comprehensive kinds of cognitive change, however, especially those involving change in knowledge acquisition strategies themselves, poses serious methodological challenges. Developmental psychologists have been in the particularly difficult position of seeking to understand developmental change without observing it directly. As has now been widely noted, the cross-sectional and even longitudinal designs that are the staples of developmental psychology may provide suggestive data regarding change, but they do not afford direct observation of the process Wohlwill, 1973). The microgenetic method has been advocated as a way out of this i mpasse. As described by Kuhn and Phelps (1982), the goal of the method is to accelerate the change process by providing a subject with frequent opportunities over a period of weeks or months to engage the particular cognitive strategies that are the object of investigation. This increased density of exercise of existing strategies may lead to change, allowing the researcher close observation of the process.In the initial work by Kuhn and Phelps (1982), we chose strategies of wide applicability as a basis for exploring the utility of the methodstrategies of inductive causal inference that are fundamental to knowledge acquisition and can be identified in both scientific and informal reasoning (Kuhn, 1991, 1993). In weekly sessions, preadolescent subjects were asked to identify causal and noncausal effects as they freely investigated a domain in which multiple variables played potential causal roles in influencing an outcome.Strategies of investigation and inference did improve in a ma jority of subjects over the period of observation. In a comparison condition (Kuhn & Ho, 1980), subjects each week were presented with a set of antecedentoutcome instances identical to that which the subject's yoked control in the free investigation condition had selected for examination; these subjects also showed some, but less, change. Subsequent research (Kuhn et al. , 1992; Schauble, 1990, in press), including the present study, has followed this same paradigm of microgenetic examination of inductive inference strategies in multivariable contexts.Meanwhile, other developmental researchers, notably Siegler and his colleagues (Siegler & Jenkins, 1989), began to use the microgenetic method, in Siegler's case in the very different domain of elementary addition strategies. 8 STRATEGIES KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUISITION Among other researchers who have used a microgenetic method in various domains are Bidell and Fischer (1994), Granott (1993), Karmiloff-Smith (1984), Lawler (1985), and Metz ( 1985, 1993). In addition, a line of Genevan work beginning with a study by Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder (1974) falls under the heading of microgenetic research.In certain respects, modern microgenetic research connects to work in the genetic tradition of Werner (1948), although the latter was limited to observation within a single session. Enough microgenetic work has accrued by now to make comparison and generalization possible (Siegler & Crowley, 1991). Studies conducted within very different domains show convergence in several important respects. Most important, they provide a clear indication of what the change process is not-simple replacement of a less adequate approach with a more adequate one.Instead, subjects commonly exhibit intraindividual variability in the strategies that they apply to identical problems, with less adequate strategies coexisting in a subject's repertory together with more adequate ones. The initial appearance of a new strategy, then, does not mark its c onsistent application. Instead, less adequate strategies continue to compete with it, and, indeed, the more formidable challenge appears to be abandoning the old, rather than acquiring the new-a reversal in the way that development is traditionally conceived.Change does occur, but it appears as a gradual shift in the distribution of use of a set of strategies of varying adequacy. The most recent microgenetic work (Granott, 1993; Metz, 1993) offers a number of additional insights regarding the nature of the change process. We return to them in the final chapter in discussing insights from the present work. As described earlier in this chapter, a main purpose of the present work is to extend the microgenetic method in ways that address several critical questions.One is whether the variability and change observed in microgenetic studies is particular to subjects in a period of developmental transition or is a more general phenomenon. A second is the extent to which such change is gener al as opposed to domain specific. Domain specificity versus domain generality of cognitive strategies is a topic at the heart of much current debate in the field of cognitive development (KarmiloffSmith, 1994). In a previous study (Kuhn et al. , 1992), we addressed this question by having subjects work simultaneously in two domains, with separate sessions each week devoted to each.This study provided some evidence of generality in that improvements in strategy tended to co-occur in rough synchrony across the two domains. These findings, however, do not provide an answer to the more traditional question of whether the newly developed competencies would transfer to new content to which the subject had not been previously exposed. This question is addressed in the present work. Studies of transfer have served as the traditional means for assessing generality: Does a newly acquired competency transfer to a new context? 9 KUHN ET AL.Whether the subjects are preschool children or college adults, in a majority of cases the answer has been no. Such findings have led to critical scrutiny of the transfer construct (Detterman & Sternberg, 1993) as well as increasingly domain-specific conceptions of cognitive development (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Why should transfer to new contexts be expected? Two prevailing conceptualizations of transfer offer somewhat different answers. In the more common conceptualization, transfer is seen as mediated by a symbolic representation of the problem domain (Brown, 1989, 1990; Gentner, 1983, 1989; Holyoak, 1984; Singley & Anderson, 1989).To the extent that there is overlap between the representations of two problem domains (i. e. , the extent to which the elements of one map onto the elements of the other), transfer between the two should occur. In a study by Brown and Kane (1988), for example, subjects had to recognize a connection between pulling a boat ashore with a fishing rod and pulling someone out of a hole with a spade. A somewhat di fferent conception of transfer (Greeno, Smith, & Moore, 1993) emphasizes the activity that the problem solver engages in.To the extent the activity is common to two settings, transfer will occur. In the words of Greeno et al. (1993, p. 146), â€Å"The structure that enables transfer is in the interactive activity of the person in the situation. †¦ When transfer occurs it is because of general properties and relations of the person's interaction with features of a situation. † It is this latter conception of transfer that fits our paradigm better than the first one (which is sometimes referred to as analogical transfer).The strategies that subjects develop are very broadly applicable across a wide range of content, but subjects learn to apply these strategies only within the context of particular, relatively narrow content. Will these strategies generalize to new and diverse kinds of content? This classic transfer question is complicated by the findings from microgenetic research. As noted earlier, microgenetic data indicate that, at a given point in time, a subject does not possess just a single strategy but instead selects trategies from a repertory that includes multiple strategies of varying adequacy. Given this situation, assessment on a single occasion within a single content domain may produce an inaccurate characterization of the subject'scompetence (since the subject might have selected a different strategy). As a consequence, studies that assess competence across domains are even more error prone. To overcome these limitations, in the present work we situate the transfer design in a microgenetic context, substituting new content midway through the observation period.Through this technique we hope to answer a critical question about the generality of the change induced in microgenetic studies as well as to assess transfer in a more dynamic way than it has been approached in the past. 10 STRATEGIES OFKNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION Metacognition,Forma lOperations,and ScientificReasoning Piaget (1950; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, 1969) offered an explicit account of a developmental progression in strategies of knowledge acquisition. Young children construct rudimentary concepts of the type examined by Keil (1989, 1991) that we referred to earlier.With the advent of concrete operations at the age of 6 or 7, concepts acquire the properties of systematic hierarchical classes. A further major development occurs with the appearance of formal operations at adolescence, when second-order relations between categories begin to be examined-the skill on which the present Monographfocuses. Piaget's theoretical model of formal operations has been criticized (for a review, see Keating, 1980), and in his later work (Piaget & Garcia, 1991) there is evidence that even he came to regard the model as insufficiently concerned with the meaning of the propositions that subjects contemplated.Empirical research relating to formal operations has been largely focused on subjects'ability to conduct scientific investigation of the relations between variables in a multivariable context, and here, in contrast, Inhelder and Piaget's (1958) pioneering work has been substantially replicated (Keating, 1980; Moshman, in press). Both the methods and the conclusions of scientific investigation are likely to be faulty among subjects younger than midadolescence; moreover, as research subsequent to Inhelder and Piaget's has shown, even older adolescents and many adults often perform poorly as scientists (Dunbar & Klahr, 1989; Klahr et al. 1993; Kuhn et al. , 1988; Schauble & Glaser, 1990). Although they did not use the term, Inhelder and Piaget (1958) in effect attributed poor performance in scientific reasoning tasks to metacognitive weakness, defined as the inability to contemplate one's own thought as an object of cognition or, in their (1958) terms, to engage in second-order operations on operations. To the extent that such an ability is truly lac king, the ramifications no doubt extend well beyond the realm of scientific reasoning (Kuhn, 1992a, 1993).Subsequent to Inhelder and Piaget's (1958) work, metacognition has become a topic of widespread interest (Flavell, 1979, 1993; Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1995; Flavell & Wellman, 1977; ForrestPressley, MacKinnon, & Waller, 1985; Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994; Moshman, 1979, 1990, 1995; Schneider, 1985), but the term has been variably and often loosely defined, with the majority of investigators employing it in its initial and more restricted sense of knowledge and management of one's cognitive strategies, particularly memory strategies.In the present work, we make a distinction between metacognitive knowledge and metastrategic knowledge, a distinction that parallels in many respects the lower-order distinction between declarative and procedural 11 KUHNETAL. knowledge. Metacognitive knowledge involves awareness of and reflection on the content of one's thought, ranging from simple a wareness of the content of one's present or immediately prior thought (Flavell et al. , 1995) to reflection on a set of propositions that one believes to be true or chooses to take under consideration (Moshman, 1990).Metastrategic knowledge involves awareness and management of the strategies that are applied in the course of thinking and problem solving (Sternberg, 1984). Both metacognitive and metastrategic knowledge entail treating one's own cognition as itself an object of cognition-a form of cognitive â€Å"distancing†(Sigel, 1993). Both metacognitive and metastrategic knowledge, we will claim, figure importantly in the development of the cognitive skills examined in this Monograph.If knowledge acquisition is a process of theory revision, as we have claimed, to accomplish the process in a skilled way the individual needs to be aware of and reflect on a theory (metacognitive competence), coordinating it with new evidence by means of strategies that are inferentially sound and applied in a consistent manner (metastrategic competence). In the total absence of such competence, evidence and theory are not represented as distinct entities.In this case, new evidence may lead to modification of a theory (as it does even among very young children), but the process takes place outside the individual's conscious control (Kuhn, 1989). There is a problem, however, with attributing proficiency in knowledge acquisition or scientific reasoning to the development of metacognitive or metastrategic competencies emerging at adolescence. Competent scientific reasoning entails a number of component skills, and data exist suggesting that at least rudimentary forms of all these skills are in place well before adolescence.In addition to the metacognitive and metastrategic abilitiesjust discussed, included among these skills are the ability to entertain alternative possibilities, to detect and interpret covariation, and to isolate and control variables. One study (Richardson , 1992) in particular stands out for its strong claim of early competence. Even young children, the author maintains, readily interpret both additive and interactive effects of three or more variables-a claim that stands in striking contradiction to data to be presented in this Monographdemonstrating the difficulty that even adults have with such coordinations.The data from Richardson's study, however, cannot be clearly interpreted for a number of methodological reasons, foremost among them being the failure to examine individual patterns of performance and distinguish them from group data. The remaining studies of early competence make more modest claims that certain abilities traditionally associated with scientific reasoning are present in rudimentary forms in young children. Sodian, Zaitchik, and Carey (1991), for example, undertook a study to show that young children 12 STRATEGIES KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUISITION an distinguish between an assertion and evidence that bears on the assert ion if the context is simple enough. They posed first- and second-grade in their house was a large or small one, which they did by placing food in a box overnight. Two boxes were available, one with a large opening (able to accommodate a large or a small mouse) and one with a small opening (big enough for only the small mouse to pass through). The subject was asked which of the two boxes the children should put food in. Sodian et al. (1991) report that 11 of 20 first graders and 12 of 14 second graders preferred the determinate solution (i. . , chose the small-opening box), indicating both considerable competence and considerable development in this age range. Sodian et al. (1991) note that their subjects' performance reflects a differentiation of hypothesis and evidence since the hypothesis (large or small mouse) is distinguished from the evidence that will test it (the food disappears or does not). Note, however, that the potential confusion in this case is not between theories an d evidence (mice and food) but rather lies in the selection of the form of evidence appropriate to test a theory.In a subsequent set of more detailed studies, Ruffman, Perner, Olson, and Doherty (1993) report similar evidence in comparably simple contexts even among some 5-year-olds (as well as 6- and 7-year-olds). In fact, everyday observation confirms that implicit forms of theory-evidence coordination occur at even earlier ages-illustrated, for example, by a 2-year-old who calls her parents into her bedroom with the claim that it is a ghost in her closet that is the cause of a soft â€Å"whooshing† noise that is keeping her awake.This child understands as well as her parents that opening the closet door will provide the evidence capable of disconfirming this causal hypothesis, even though she lacks any metacognitive awareness of her own belief states as hypotheses to be coordinated with evidence. The valuable function served by Ruffman et al. ‘s (1993) study is to ma ke clear the connection that exists between early theory-of-mind competencies (Feldman, 1992; Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990) and competencies that figure importantly in scientific reasoning.Both have strong metacognitive aspects. The 4-year-old child who comes to recognize that an assertion is not necessarily correct-that the candy can be believed to be in the cupboard and in truth be elsewhere (Perner, 1991)-has achieved an essential milestone in the development of scientific reasoning ability. This child has made at least a primitive differentiation between what a mind theorizes to be true and information from the external world that bears on this theory. False beliefs, by definition, are subject to disconfirmation by evidence. Although it has ometimes been treated this way in the literature, metacognition, like cognition, is not a zero-one, present-absent phenomenon that emerges in full bloom at a particular point in development. The position subjectsa problemin which some children wanted to find out if a mouse 13 KUHNETAL. taken in this Monographis that the development of metacognitive competence, like that of metastrategic competence, takes place very gradually over many years and involves a process of increasing â€Å"explicitation†(KarmiloffSmith, 1992) of skills present in implicit form.Metacognitive competence develops from its most rudimentary forms (examined by Flavell and Gopnik and their colleagues in studies to be described shortly) to the more highly developed, explicit forms demanded by the activities in which subjects in the present research engage. Ruffman et al. (1993) illustrate the evolution of early emerging metacognitive capability relevant to scientific reasoning by asking subjects to reason about propositions as belief states (a requirement not present in Sodian et al. ‘s, 1991, study).They ensure that subjects do so by explicitly characterizing these belief states as false. Many (although not all) of the 5-7-year-olds in the ir research judged that a story character who observes a set of dolls who usually choose red over green food will conclude that the dolls like red food, even though the subjects themselves have been told that this is not the true state of affairs (the dolls really like green food, the subject is told). In this respect, the child comprehends the relation between a pattern of evidence and a theory (the contrary-to-fact hypothesis held by the story character).Put in different terms, the child can draw appropriate inferences from contrary-to-fact propositions (an ability that Piaget tied to the emergence of formal operations). In a follow-up experiment, Ruffman et al. showed that this comprehension extends to predictive judgments (e. g. , that the dolls will choose red food again). In theory-of-mind terms, these children are drawing appropriate inferences regarding others' belief states (or theories, as long as we agree to use this term in its broad sense), even when they have been told that these theories are not correct. The material is deliberately designed so that the child's own theoretical preferences are likely to be neutral. ) The portrayal of early proficiency in metacognitive competencies important to scientific reasoning that Ruffman et al. (1993) offer needs to be qualified, however, by other research demonstrating that the period between 4 and 8 years of age is one of significant development of the basic metacognitive competencies that serve as underpinnings of more complex forms of reasoning about propositions. A series of studies by Flavell et al. 1995) showed 3-5-year-old children to have considerable difficulty accurately reporting either their own immediately preceding mental activity or that of another individual, in contexts in which that mental activity had been particularly clear and salient. In contrast, 7-8-year-olds were largely (although not entirely) successful in such tasks. Distinctions between (second-order) representations (and conse quent verbal reports) of thinking about an object and (first-order) representations of the object itself appeared fragile in the younger children.The older ones, like children of a 14 STRATEGIES KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUISITION similar age in Ruffman et al. ‘s (1993) research, were better able to make inferences that depended on representations of mental states. In related work, Gopnik and her colleagues (Gopnik & Graf, 1988; Gopnik & Slaughter, 1991) showed that preschoolers have a limited awareness of the source of their beliefs-a metacognitive ability that figures prominently in the work presented in this Monograph.Gopnik and Graf (1988) found that, even in very simple situations, 3- and 4-year-olds could not identify where knowledge they had just acquired had come from-for example, whether they had learned the contents of a drawer from seeing them or being told about them. Performance was significantly improved, however, among 5-year-olds. Some of Gopnik and Graf's 3- and 4-year-o lds might even have been successful in Sodian et al. ‘s (1991) task of differentiating and coordinating a theory (about a mouse's size) and evidence (of food eaten or not) bearing on it, but they showed remarkablylittle differentiation of theory and evidence at he metacognitive level of distinguishing the representation of what they knew (the contents of the drawer) from a representation of the evidence that had provided this knowledge. Once the knowledge was acquired, the two evidently became fused into a single representation that encompassed only the knowledge itself. Supporting this interpretation are other findings showing that preschool children report that they have â€Å"always known† knowledge that was just acquired in the experimental situation (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Taylor, Esbensen, & Bennett, 1994).Evidence regarding early strategic (as opposed to metastrategic or metacognitive) competence related to scientific reasoning is largely positive. Ruffman et al. ‘s (1993) study substantiates that one of several simple strategic competencies entailed in scientific reasoning-inferring causality from covariation evidence-poses no great difficulty among young children, as earlier research had shown (Mendelson & Shultz, 1976; Shultz & Mendelson, 1975). Indeed, this ability is evident at the sensorimotor level in human infants (Piaget, 1952) as well as in nonhuman organisms.By the end of the first year of life, infants have begun to make causal inferences based on the juxtaposition of an antecedent and an outcome. As data in the present illustrate, it is the fact that this inference strategy is overlearned Monograph that causes problems. Precursors to the critical control-of-variables strategy most closely associated with scientific reasoning are also evident. Most elementary among these are judgments of comparison, first in terms of an individual (Can I run faster than my brother? , later in terms of groups of individuals (Can the girl s in the class run faster than the boys? ). Once the concept of a fair comparison emerges (What if the boys wore running shoes and the girls didn't? ), it remains only to formalize the comparison into the framework of a controlled test of relations between variables (gender and running speed). 15 KUHNETAL. Case (1974) has shown that, although they do not do so spontaneously, children as young as age 8 can readily be taught to carry out controlled comparisons.Early developing forms of metastrategic competence are also evident. A skill important to scientific reasoning is recognition of the indeterminacy associated with entertaining alternative possibilities. This skill is explored in a line of research beginning with studies by Pieraut-Le Bonniec (1980). During the early childhood years, children develop the ability to discriminate between situations that have determinate solutions and those that do not or, in other words, to know whether they have an answer-a competency having clear metastrategic aspects. For a review of research, see Acredolo & O'Connor, 1991, or Byrnes & Beilin, 1991. ) The study by Sodian et al. (1991) can also be interpreted in these terms. In the face of evidence of all this early competence, a perplexing problem is to explain the persistent poor performance of children, adolescents, and many adults in full-fledged scientific reasoning tasks, that is, ones in which they are asked to examine a database and draw conclusions (Dunbar & Klahr, 1989; Klahr et al. , 1993; Kuhn et al. 1988; Schauble & Glaser, 1990). Addressing this critical question is an important objective of the present Monograph. With repeated exercise, we find, knowledge acquisition strategies improve among most subjects, but these strategies remain error prone and inadequate among many adults as well as children. Microgenetic data will, we hope, provide insight into the obstacles that impede success in these fundamental forms of reasoning and knowledge acquisition. We there fore return to this question after the data have been presented.Inductive Causal Inferencein Multivariable Contexts It is a curiosity that research on scientific reasoning (originating and remaining largely in the developmental literature) has proceeded independently of and remains largely unintegrated with research on multivariable inductive causal inference (centered in the adult cognition literature). The central difference between the two is a simple one. Whereas studies of scientific reasoning typically involve selecting instances to create a database, studies of inductive causal inference involve presenting instances from a database for examination.In both, however, the subject must interpret the evidence and draw conclusions, these conclusions being the end product of the process in both cases. Kuhn and Brannock (1977) argued that the â€Å"natural experiment† situation involved in studies of inductive inference elicits forms of reasoning paralleling those identified i n earlier studies of isolation of variables within the framework of formal operations and scientific reasoning. 16 STRATEGIES KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUISITIONAlthough there exists a large literature on the development of causal inference (for a review, see Bullock, 1985; Bullock, Gelman, & Baillargeon, 1982; Sedlak & Kurtz, 1981), with the exception of our own developmental studies (Kuhn & Brannock, 1977; Kuhn & Phelps, 1982; Kuhn et al. , 1988) theoretical and empirical work on multivariable causal inference has largely been located in the adult cognition literature. Like much of the literature on scientific reasoning development, the developmental literature on causal inference highlights the child's early competence.As noted earlier, from an early age children draw on covariation information, as well as other cues, as a basis for inferences of causality (Mendelson & Shultz, 1976; Shultz & Mendelson, 1975). Equally important, from an early age they have theories of causal mechanism that i nfluence their causal judgments (Shultz, 1982), a finding consonant with the more recent conceptual change literature. Within the adult literature, theoretical analysis has focused largely on covariation as the most important source of information about causality.Mill's (1843/1973) ‘joint method of agreement and difference† identifies covariation as the appropriate basis for inferences of causality, and Kelley's (1967) extensively researched attribution model similarly rests on covariation between antecedent and outcome. More recent investigators have followed in this tradition but have sought to identify more precisely the inductive strategies that mediate between a covariational database and an inference of causality.In empirical studies, typically a set of multivariable instances is presented in written form and the subject asked to judge what inferences can be drawn (Briggs, 1991; Cheng & Novick, 1990; Downing et al. , 1985; Schustack & Sternberg, 1981). On the basis of such data, Schustack and Sternberg (1981) developed a linear regression model to assign weights to five types of covariation information. The first four are frequencies of the joint presence of antecedent and outcome, the joint absence of antecedent and outcome, the presence of antecedent and the absence of outcome, and the bsence of antecedent and the presence of outcome. A fifth factor is the strength of competing causes. Although adult subjects show consistency, leading to positive regression weights for the first two frequencies and negative weights for the second two, Cheng and Novick (1992) identify several theoretical anomalies in the linear regression model, for example, the role of base-level frequencies of antecedent and outcome in predicting the likelihood of a causal inference, factors that intuitively should not affect the causal status of the antecedent.An even more critical problem, however, for such models of induction purely from an empirical database is the she er computational weight of the task. The four frequencies in the Schustack and Sternberg model pertain to a single potential cause and outcome. Once the causal field is opened to a host of causal candidates (as it is in natural settings), the computational 17 KUHNETAL. burden quickly becomes enormous. Some means of narrowing the causal field to a set of manageable factors is needed.Different approaches have been taken to accomplishing this objective, but they have in common restriction of the set of potential causes to the â€Å"set of events considered relevant by the attributor† (Cheng & Novick, 1990, p. 562). In other words, theoretical expectation on the part of the subject, arising from a preexisting knowledge base, is invoked as a factor in the attribution of causality. Cheng and Novick (1990, 1992) propose that, within this focal set, inferences of causality are based on estimated differences in the probabilities of the effect in the presence versus the absence of the potential cause.Hilton and Slugoski (1986) specify â€Å"abnormal conditions†-those absent in a comparison condition-as the ones likely to be attributed as causes. Both models invoke the distinction emphasized by Mackie (1974) and others (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986) between causes and enabling conditions. In Cheng and Novick's (1992) model, factors yielding substantial differences across instances will be attributed as causes, whereas factors that are constant across instances will be either regarded as enabling conditions, if they are perceived as relevant, or dismissed as causally irrelevant (and hence excluded from the focal set).Note that the latter distinction rests entirely on the subject's theoretical belief. Covariation within a focal set of instances may well provide the basis for a judgment of causality, but, when this covariation is absent, theoretical belief offers the only basis for judging whether constant factors are causally relevant (as enabling conditions) or n oncausal. Studies in the adult causal inference literature have tended to focus only on inferences of causality, treating inferences of noncausality almost as noninferences.They have not addressed the converse of the covariation principle-evidence of noncovariation over a set of instances as a basis for an inference of noncausality-or in general examined how empirical evidence might play a role in inferences of noncausality. As discussed in the next section, we see noncausal inference as occupying a prominent place in inductive inference, scientific reasoning, and knowledge acquisition, and these inferences are a central object of attention in the present work.We also pay a good deal of attention to another problem that Cheng and Novick (1992) acknowledge is not addressed by their model-inferences of causality based on spurious covariation of a noncausal factor with an outcome. The fact that we examine inductive inference over a period of time as a database of instances accumulates enables us to observe how a subject may gradually overcome the temptation of this invalid inference strategy as well as more generally how the subject coordinates accumulating new evidence with theoretical expectation.Most studies of causal inference have confined subjects to the presentation of a single set of instances 18 STRATEGIES KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUISITION on a single occasion (with data analysis typically confined to the group level). In contrast, we ask subjects to seek out the evidence that they believe adequate to support their causal and noncausal inferences, and we follow them individually in their efforts to interpret this evidence and integrate it with existing knowledge.We turn now to an examination of the inference strategies that individuals might employ as they engage in this task. AND NONCAUSAL CAUSAL STRATEGIES INDUCTIVE OF INFERENCE Causal Inference(Inclusion) On what evidence might someone base the inference that antecedent a has a causal influence on outcome o? I n the framework adopted here, we assume a multivariable context, and we assume that the individual is able to select instances to attend to. The question facing the individual is whether a particular factor a makes a difference to the outcome.For simplicity of exposition, we consider the case in which the identified factors-a, b, c, d, and e-are dichotomous (two-level) variables. (Certain differences arise if the two levels of these variables are treated as presence and absence, but, again for simplicity of exposition, they need not be taken into consideration here, and the two levels of each variable will be designated by the subscripts 1 and 2. ) A further assumption that we make is that selection of instances is at least partially theory motivated.In other words, the individual's prior beliefs about the causal and noncausal status of the identified factors influence the selection of instances to attend to. This selectivity takes a variety of forms that need not be identified in d etail at this point; some examples are the tendencies to select instances believed to produce the most positive level of an outcome (a success rather than an explanation orientation) and to fail to investigate factors that are believed noncausal.A minimal (but, as we shall document, frequent) basis for the inference that an antecedent a and an outcome o are causally related-an inference to which we refer henceforth as the inclusionof a-is their co-occurrence within a multivariable context: al blcdl el — ol. (1) We refer to such an inference as a co-occurrence false inclusion inference (because a and o merely co-occur on one occasion). Such inferences are based on only a single instance and are of course invalid since the cooccurrence does not establish that a played a causal role in producing o. 19KUHNETAL. In the case in which an individual selects at least two instances for examination, an informative second instance would be (2a) a2b c1d1el – 02. Such an instance, w ith the outcome shown, allows the valid inclusion inference that a is causally implicated in o. This inference, based on two instances, is the product of a controlled comparison. In most natural settings, however, people do not have the luxury of selecting for observation exactly those instances that would be most informative with respect to the inferences they al

Battle of Long Island in the American Revolution

Battle of Long Island in the American Revolution The Battle of Long Island was fought August 27-30, 1776 during the American Revolution (1775-1783). Following his successful capture of Boston in March 1776, General George Washington began shifting his troops south to New York City. Correctly believing the city to be the next British target, he set about preparing for its defense. This work had commenced in February under the guidance of  Major General Charles Lee and continued under the supervision of Brigadier General William Alexander, Lord Stirling in March. Despite the efforts, a lack of manpower meant that the planned fortifications were not complete by late spring. These included a variety of redoubts, bastions, and Fort Stirling overlooking the East River. Reaching the city, Washington established his headquarters in the former home of Archibald Kennedy on Broadway near Bowling Green and began devising a plan to hold the city. As he lacked naval forces, this task proved difficult as New Yorks rivers and waters would permit the British to outflank any American positions. Realizing this, Lee lobbied Washington to abandon the city. Though he listened to Lees arguments, Washington decided to remain at New York as he felt the city possessed significant political importance. Armies Commanders Americans General George Washingtonapprox. 10,000 men British General William Howeapprox. 20,000 men Washingtons Plan To defend the city, Washington divided his army into five divisions, with three at the south end of Manhattan, one at Fort Washington (northern Manhattan), and one on Long Island. The troops on Long Island were led by Major General Nathanael Greene. A capable commander, Greene was struck down by with fever in the days before the battle and command devolved to Major General Israel Putnam. As these troops moved into position, they continued work on the citys fortifications. On Brooklyn Heights, a large complex of redoubts and entrenchments took shape that included the original Fort Stirling and ultimately mounted 36 guns. Elsewhere, hulks were sunk to deter the British from entering the East River. In June the decision was made to construct Fort Washington at the northern end of Manhattan and Fort Lee across in New Jersey to prevent passage up the Hudson River. Howes Plan On July 2, the British, led by General William Howe and his brother Vice Admiral Richard Howe, began arriving and made camp on Staten Island. Additional ships arrived throughout the month adding to the size of the British force. During this time, the Howes attempted to negotiate with Washington but their offers were consistently rebuffed. Leading a total of 32,000 men, Howe prepared his plans for taking New York while his brothers ships secured control of the waterways around the city. On August 22, he moved around 15,000 men across the Narrows and landed them at Gravesend Bay. Meeting no resistance, British forces, led by Lieutenant General Lord Charles Cornwallis, advanced to Flatbush and made camp. Moving to block the British advance, Putnams men deployed onto a ridge known as the Heights of Guan. This ridge was cut by four passes at Gowanus Road, Flatbush Road, Bedford Pass, and Jamaica Pass. Advancing, Howe feinted towards Flatbush and Bedford Passes causing Putnam to reinforce these positions. Washington and Putnam hoped to entice the British into mounting costly direct assaults on the heights before pulling their men back into the fortifications on Brooklyn Heights. As the British scouted the American position, they learned from local Loyalists that Jamaica Pass was only defended by five militiamen. This information was passed to Lieutenant General Henry Clinton who devised an attack plan using this route. The British Attack As Howe discussed their next steps, Clinton had his plan for moving through Jamaica Pass at night and flanking the Americans put forward. Seeing an opportunity to crush the enemy, Howe approved the operation. To hold the Americans in place while this flank attack was developing, a secondary attack would be launched near Gowanus by Major General James Grant. Approving this plan, Howe set it in motion for the night of August 26/27. Moving through Jamaica Pass undetected, Howes men fell upon Putnams left wing the following morning. Breaking under British fire, American forces began retreating toward the fortifications on Brooklyn Heights (Map). On the far right of the American line, Stirlings brigade defended against Grants frontal assault. Advancing slowly to pin Stirling in place, Grants troops took heavy fire from the Americans. Still not fully grasping the situation, Putnam ordered Stirling to remain in position despite the approach of Howes columns. Seeing disaster looming, Washington crossed to Brooklyn with reinforcements and took direct control of the situation. His arrival was too late to save Stirlings brigade. Caught in a vise and fighting desperately against overwhelming odds, Stirling was slowly forced back.   As the bulk of his men withdrew, Stirling led a force Maryland troops in rearguard action that saw them delay the British before being captured. Their sacrifice allowed the remainder of Putnams men to escape back to Brooklyn Heights. Within the American position at Brooklyn, Washington possessed around 9,500 men. While he knew that the city could not be held without the heights, he was also aware that Admiral Howes warships could cut his lines of retreat to Manhattan. Approaching the American position, Major General Howe elected to begin building siege lines rather than directly assaulting the fortifications. On August 29, Washington realized the true danger of the situation and ordered a withdrawal to Manhattan. This was conducted during the night with Colonel John Glovers regiment of Marblehead sailors and fisherman manning the boats. Aftermath The defeat at Long Island cost Washington 312 killed, 1,407 wounded, and 1,186 captured. Among those captured were Lord Stirling and Brigadier General John Sullivan. British losses were a relatively light 392 killed and wounded. A disaster for American fortunes in New York, the defeat at Long Island was the first in a string of reverses which culminated in the British capture of the city and surrounding area. Badly defeated, Washington was forced retreat across New Jersey that fall, finally escaping into Pennsylvania. American fortunes finally changed for the better that Christmas when Washington won a needed victory at the Battle of Trenton.

Happiness Essays

Happiness Essays Happiness Essay Happiness Essay William Min Lacy 3A AP Lang NOV. 14, 2013 The Fluid, Ambiguous Nature of Happiness Happiness is green and adorned with the faces of our nations fathers. Happiness is a good cigar and a strong margarita. Happiness is finishing your paper early so you can enjoy the rest of your weekend. Happiness is the sensation brought by victory or triumph. Happiness is having the picture-perfect family often seen on the screen of televisions. Happiness is large pizzas, a couple beers, and enjoying the Sunday Night prime time matchup with a group of fellow fans. Happiness can be represented by irtually anything, yet people give vague answers when asked What makes you happy? or Are you happy? We oft receive answers that leave us more unfulfilled than if we simply did not ask at all. Is everyone ashamed of what makes them happy or do they Just simply not know? Perhaps the best and only explanation for this befuddling situation is: Happiness is cannot be defined. We know what has made us happy before, but at any given time, what makes us happy is a mystery hiding in the depths of our hearts. As it is written in the constitution, every American is ntitled to the basic right: the pursuit of happiness. Of Mice and Men by John Steinbeck represents this concept perfectly, as Lennie and George are driven by their vision of eventually owning their own plot of land and a bunny patch on that land. However, Crooks, the black farmhand, delivers the reality of the situation: Just like heaven. Everbody wants a little piece of Ian. I read plenty of books out here. Nobody never gets to heaven, and nobody gets no land. Its Just in their head. : Theyre all the time talkin about it, but its Jus in their head. (43) This emphasizes how it is only the ursuit, and not the goal, that we are entitled to. This Journey to find Joy often also ends tragically, sometimes more so than not even reaching the arbitrary line in the ground where we draw our happiness. Jay Gatsby experiences the heartbreak of this empty Journey in The Great Gatsby after the magic with him and Daisy fades had occurred to [Gatsby] that the colossal significance of that light had now vanished forever. Compared to the great distance that had separated him from Daisy it had seemed very near to her, almost touching her. It had seemed as close as a star to the oon. Now it was again a green light on a dock. His count of enchanted objects had diminished by one. (121) Fitzgerald describes, how after the initial honeymoon period, Gatsby realizes Daisy Buchanan is not the same woman from his dream. His whole life has been driven by the motivation of finishing the fairy tale between him and Daisy, yet once he is with her, Gatsby finds that the void in his heart is still left unfilled. Despite how much he believed it, Daisy was not a one-way ticket to euphoria and was imperfect Just like himself. The quest of happiness is rarely finished and hose who finish after many years of toiling find that what they wanted before is not what they want now. The fluctuating nature of human happiness has been well- initially respond with miou choose or l dont care, but right as we enter the car, we form our own opinion after the decision has been made. A new taco place Just opened up, maybe there was a special deal at the buffet, perhaps an overwhelming craving for chocolate cake at that one place suddenly developed. Then once we arrive at the restaurant that took arguing and manipulation to get to, the question of what o eat becomes even more difficult than the question of where. If we knew what made us happy, this classic, sticky dinner situation would not sound so familiar. What made us happy yesterday or what makes us happy right now likely will not be the same even a couple hours into the future. Just like our Christmas presents and dinner plans, to be truly happy, we ask for something different every time and what we say might not even be what we want. Speaking of dinner plans, Malcolm Gladwell discusses the fickle nature of human happiness in his TED talk, Choice, Happiness, and Spaghetti Sauce. Referencing the progression of the food industry, he mentions the innovation that Howard Moskowitz brought to the table, literally. Prior to Moskowitz, food science was always based on studies where researchers would verbally ask people what they wanted out of a certain food. Moskowitz asked the same question, but to their taste buds, rather than their ears. He discovered people could not always express their desire and perhaps were oblivious to their own preferences. Extra-chunky spaghetti sauce was not a thing before the studies Moskowitz conducted. One-third of all Americans now prefer extra-chunky, but could ot express their deep longing for this type of spaghetti sauce until Moskowitz cooked it up and realized the widespread popularity of this variety that was yet to be produced. Gladwell also mentions coffee and how people claim they want a dark, rich, hearty blend, yet most people actually prefer a milky, weak coffee. (Gladwell) Humans may not know what they want at all, not until theyVe tried and established preferences for themselves. Calling happiness elusive or hard to find would be misleading, as virtually anybody can find a moment in their day where they are appy. Rather, it avoids those who aimlessly attempt to seek it. Impulses are wired into human mentality and it makes us impulsive beings by nature. The criteria happiness is contingent upon is everchanging and fluctuates with our urges. What you yourself find happiness in, others may find laughable. What made you happy when you were 10 years old is likely not going to make you happy now. What you thought would make you happy may very well not be what you wanted at all. Happiness will always exist, but will always do so in a capricious state. Ironic as it ay be, those who set out to define and find their personal happiness often end up finding the least. Too often do we try to define ourselves as someone who we want to be, rather than who we are, and forget that our happiness is not found in a fictitious image of ourselves, but in the essence of the person we actually are. Fitzgerald, F. Scott, and Matthew J. Bruccoli. The Great Gatsby. New York, NY: Scribner, 1996. Print. Gladwell, Malcolm. Choice, Happiness, and Spaghetti Sauce. TED Talks. Long Beach. 15 Feb. 2004. Lecture. Steinbeck, John. Of Mice and Men. New York: Penguin, 1993. Print.

Access To Health Care For Australian Cultural Groups

Health care has improved the societal living standards by ensuring that all health problems are attended to in the best why possible. Through the department of health in the government, every location is considered in the improvement of the health standards to provide better service to the community. Every health problem identified is dealt with in the best way possible by the qualified doctors. Cases that cannot be solved through the capabilities of the national health problem, the international health bodies are consulted to ensure that cases like cancers receive the best care. Although the ministry of health in collaboration with the private sector are trying to achieve their best in providing best health care, some challenges are always experienced by the citizens. Due to the increased population, the Constitution has supported the private sector to indulge into the sector to improve the service provisions by providing solutions to medical issues experienced. The health care systems have been improving from time to time to make sure that there, not medical problems are left undissolved. Although the government among other groups might view the provision of healthcare as ethical, there might be issues with balancing the cultural beliefs and accessing health care in the community. For example, a specific cultural group might be believing that people should not be accessing health care, rather they should be healed through their traditional methods (Guzys and Petrie, 2013). People with different originalities inhabit the Australian state. These cultures include the Australian Aboriginal and Culturally and Linguistically Diverse communities (CALD). Therefore, this paper will focus on barriers experienced by both cultures in access to health care and the possible strategies to be used in improving the services. The Aboriginal culture in Australia consists of people whose origin is based on the Australian country, and their practice and beliefs are based on Dreamtime theory. There are several barriers to access to health care for the Aboriginal culture in Australia.   These problems are highly experienced by people living in most remotes areas in the country. The barriers have been observed through various research works conducted by the government among other independent bodies. The main barriers affecting the sufficient access to health care among the aboriginal culture include language and communication, telecommunications, service providers’ trust and transport services (Durey et al., 2013).   Research that was funded by the government was conducted in 2008 to check whether the aboriginals spoke a language that could be understood by their equivalent service providers. This was a government idea to check how efficient were the services offered by the government to the citizens, especially to the field of health (Kunitz and Brady, 2010). The national language in Australia is English, but some people do not understand or speak the language because of lack of knowledge. Based on the research results, around 13% of the Aboriginal culture had another main language other than the national language. Rather, the main language in some localities is not English, which made it difficult to communicate with the health professionals. Amongst this percentage, 46% were perceived to originate from the remote areas in the country, and 2% were from urban areas. Further, the results showed that around 15% of these people were not in a position to communicate in English. For the people of age s 55years and above had the highest percentage (24%) of people who could not communicate in English.   This indicated that the government had a great task to solve the societal problem (Blackwell, 2013). There was a great difference in percentages between the people who were connected to the internet between the residents of remote and non-remote areas. Based on research conducted by National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Survey (NATSISS), 98% of the aboriginals had access to telephones regardless of the type of phone. However, 40%, 20%, and 19% used home landlines, public phones, and others respectively. Figure 1: Phone usage among the remote and non-remote aboriginal residents (Abs, 2010) Trust is a paramount element that is factored in the service industry. The doctor should trust their patients in cases of requests for services otherwise the quality of service will be low. The residents should also trust the local hospitals and the workers to ensure that they do not perceive negative thoughts. A higher level of trust will mean that every person can seek medical assistance from the doctors at any time (Liaw et al., 2011). Based on trust study conducted among the aboriginals, some people stated they had trust issues with the doctors and the hospitals. However, a larger percentage was ok with the number medical centers and the health practitioners (Henderson, Kendall and See, 2011).  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚     Ã‚   Figure 2: Trust among the aboriginal culture (Abs, 2010) In some localities, the distance from home places to the medical centers required an efficient means of transport. It was observed if a person perceived an illness, it took a lot of time before medical help could be acquired. Due to the insufficiency in transport services, they could not access the health services easily whenever there was a need. Around 66% of the aboriginals in Australia could access means on transport any time they need, either public or private. However, statistics showed that only 7% were able to obtain transport services on emergencies, which means people who incurred emergent medical cases had high probabilities of survival. Around 32% of the people from remote areas who are unable to access transport services when needed among the aboriginal culture. These statistics shows that there is some significant percentage of individuals who are not able to access transport services when needed (Durey et al., 2013). Some strategies are supposed to be practiced to avoid the effects of the barriers in the society. The strategic practices should be focused on providing remedies to the existing societal problems. Firstly, because the community experiences an issue in communication, the government is supposed to educate people from these localities to become doctors so that they can efficiently serve the community. Otherwise, they can employ translators who will help people who cannot communicate in English effectively. These are some of the remedies for the language and communication barriers (Larson et al., 2011). Availability of telecommunication services helps people be informed about the changes in the technological world. Due to the improvements in technology, health information services are also found on the internet, thus helping the society be prevented from minor health cases. Therefore, raising the level of telecommunication access will also reduce the rate of unattended health case by raising the communities’ intelligence. The quality of health service offered by the hospitals should be raised, which increases the level of trust between the citizens and the doctors/hospitals. Qualified personnel should be employed in every single health center to cater almost all medical problems in the society (Liaw et al., 2011). Finally, the government should improve the construction of social facilities closer to the remote areas to reduce the distance covered by individual seeking for medical help. Transportation services should also be an improvement in the country by constructing roads, which raises the chances of acquiring private or public vehicles whenever needed. If these barriers are effectively managed, the social status of the aboriginal will be improved by reducing their mortality rates and increasing the efficiency of acquiring medical assistance (Steffens, Jamieson, and Kapellas, 2016). The culturally and linguistically diverse communities are perceived to be a combination of different ethnic groups who originates from different parts of the globe. These groups have diverse socio-cultural beliefs, and they varied by their religions. There are several barriers to effective health care that are experienced by the CALD communities in living in Australia. Some of these barriers are knowledge and information about available medical services, personal experiences with healthcare professionals, differences in socio-cultural and religious beliefs and influences from significant others based on health perception (Adebayo, Durey, and Slack-Smith, 2016).   Some individuals in the Australian state who are associated with the CALD communities might not be informed about the available medical health services in the country. Therefore, these particular people might suffer from some health problems that can be treated in the available health centers. For instance, a patient from foreign countries might be suffering from diabetes, a disease that can be treated in specific health centers but because of insufficient information, the condition may worsen. There might be community-based support groups that educate/inform diabetes patients on how to manage their conditions (Alzubaidi et al., 2015). Without information about the existence of such groups, the patients might not enjoy such health services. If people do not acquire the required information, they will not be involved in ongoing advice from the medical practitioners about preventions and interventions to serious societal health problems (Cross et al., 2014). Individuals from different areas in the globe will tend to have personal perceptions about hospitals and health services. Therefore, there might be problems with the way the individuals from the CALD communities interact with the doctors (MHCS, 2010). There might be cases of language barriers which leads to either misunderstanding or insufficient communication. With the differences in the communication, the patient will not receive the required medical assistance. Individuals who will be communicating in a different language will have higher chances of failed trust for the doctors compared to patients speaking in English (Australian Government | Health Department, 2011). This is because if the doctor understands the core health problem, medical assistance will be offered quickly as compared to a person whose medical issue is not yet known. The considerations of the social and emotional factors by the doctor is very important for effective medical care. It can be disappointing if a pa tient is blamed for a disease suffered by the medical practitioners.   Communities have different religious and socio-cultural belief, whereby some are attached to the way they receive medical/health services. Some individuals might be born into a culture that fears a diagnosis of certain diseases to avoid being informed that they are victims. There are some other religious beliefs, especially in Islamic culture who believe that the human life is transient, and much should not be consulted in search for life extension (Cross et al., 2014). Therefore, people from this religion might not acquire continued sufficient medical assistance because it is not according to their beliefs. Also, cultures believe that some specific health problems are as a result of a curse, and medical help should not be sought; rather they should wait and face their wrath. All these beliefs affect the delivery and access to health care services. Every individual has colleagues whom they respect and consult in every individual case. These people can affect the efficiency of the people from CALD communities accessing health care effectively. This is because they might offer wrong health advice to their friends who are in need of urgent medical assistance. For instance, a fellow might speak out about the symptoms being identified but due to assumptions, advice from friends might be inadequate for this particular case. In cases when an individual is advised to wait for recovery without seeing the doctor might lead to severe medical cases.   Firstly, the CALD communities in the Australian continent should be informed about the available hospitals and health services in their localities. This will help reduces cases of severe effects caused due to lack of information. This information can be provided through internet medical services or manuals to all the people entering the country. Solutions should be provided to the experienced problems in the health care provision systems. For instance, language barrier problem can be solved by employing language translation services. Research should be conducted to evaluate the efficiency of health services provided to help curb the extremely negative effects (Dowling, 2014). Health advice should be provided to individuals who are reported to be suffering by encouraging them to seek medical assistance where possible. This will help people having issues of culture and religion opt seeking medical help whenever they feel unwell. Finally, there should be community-based support groups t hat teach individuals about the importance of consulting the doctor whenever there is a need.   Abs, (2010). 4704.0 - The Health and Welfare of Australia's Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, Oct 2010. [Online] Abs.gov.au. Available at: https://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/lookup/4704.0Chapter960Oct+2010 [Accessed 21 Jul. 2016]. Adebayo, B., Durey, A. and Slack-Smith, L. (2016). Culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) carers' perceptions of oral care in residential aged care settings in Perth, Western Australia. Gerodontology, p.n/an/a. Alzubaidi, H., Mc Namara, K., Browning, C. and Marriott, J. (2015). Barriers and enablers to health care access and use among Arabic-speaking and Caucasian English-speaking patients with type 2 diabetes mellitus: a comparative qualitative study. BMJ Open, 5(11), pp.e008687-e008687. Australian Government|Health Department, (2011). Department of Health | People from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds. [Online] Health.gov.au. Available at: https://health.gov.au/internet/publications/publishing.nsf/Content/mental-pubs-p-mono-toc~mental-pubs-p-mono-pop~mental-pubs-p-mono-pop-cul [Accessed 21 Jul. 2016]. Blackwell, W. (2013). Guidelines on the provision of sustainable eye care for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians. Clinical and Experimental Optometry, 96(4), pp.422-423. Cross, W., Cant, R., Manning, D. and McCarthy, S. (2014). Addressing information needs of vulnerable communities about incontinence: A survey of ten CALD communities. Collegian, 21(3), pp.209-216. Dowling, M. (2014). â€Å"A guide to interpreting not just the words but the meaning intended† (A DVD to support interpreters, health care, pastoral and spiritual care staff involved in end of life and organ donation discussions with culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) families). Australian Critical Care, 27(1), p.53. Durey, A., Wynaden, D., Barr, L. and Ali, M. (2013). Improving forensic mental health care for Aboriginal Australians: Challenges and opportunities. International Journal of Mental Health Nursing, 23(3), pp.195-202. Guzys, D. and Petrie, E. (2013). An Introduction to Community and Primary Health Care in Australia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Henderson, S., Kendall, E. and See, L. (2011). The effectiveness of culturally appropriate interventions to manage or prevent chronic disease in culturally and linguistically diverse communities: a systematic literature review. Health & Social Care in the Community, 19(3), pp.225-249. Kunitz, S. and Brady, M. (2010). Health care policy for Aboriginal Australians: the relevance of the American Indian experience. Australian Journal of Public Health, 19(6), pp.549-558. Larson, B., Herx, L., Williamson, T. and Crowshoe, L. (2011). Beyond the barriers: family medicine residents’ attitudes towards providing Aboriginal health care. Medical Education, 45(4), pp.400-406. Liaw, S., Lau, P., Pyett, P., Furler, J., Burchill, M., Rowley, K., and Kelaher, M. (2011). Successful chronic disease care for Aboriginal Australians requires cultural competence. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health, 35(3), pp.238-248. MHCS, (2010). About CALD Communities — MHCS. [Online] MHCS. Available at: https://www.mhcs.health.nsw.gov.au/services/cald-community [Accessed 21 Jul. 2016]. Moyle, W., Parker, D. and Bramble, M. (2014). Care of older adults. 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press. Steffens, M., Jamieson, L. and Kapellas, K. (2016). Historical Factors, Discrimination and Oral Health among Aboriginal Australians. Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved, 27(1A), pp.30-45.